Coups d'etat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and coups and …nd that (i) successful coups increase military spending by more than failed attempts, and (ii) coups are more likely when military spending as a share of GDP is relatively low. Our identi…cation strategy exploits the conditional independence between a coup's outcome and the change in military spending that follows it. We interpret this as evidence that the military may stage coups in order to increase its funding, and rule out several alternative mechanisms.
Introduction
There is a growing consensus that political institutions and leadership matter for economic outcomes. 1 Political transitions and leadership changes often take place through coups d'etat, but coups remain a little understood political phenomenon. With the exception of Londregan and Poole (1990) , who show that low income per capita is correlated with a higher incidence of coups, the relationship between economic variables and coups has not been explored in detail.
In this paper we examine the relationship between military spending and coups. 2 Political scientists have long argued that low military spending may trigger coups, as in the case of the 1966 coup in Ghana. To justify his participation in this coup, Colonel A. A.
Afrifa claimed that "the army was rendered incapable, ill-equipped, [having] virtually been reduced to a rabble. By Christmas 1965 a number of our troops were without equipment and clothing, things essential for the pride, morale and e¢ ciency of the soldier... It was shameful to see a Ghanaian soldier in a tattered and ragged uniform, sometimes without boots during his training period" (Afrifa, 1966) . Furthermore, governments can use military spending to 'buy o¤'the military and keep it from staging coups. Nordlinger (1977) cites the example of President Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela, who "managed to serve out his entire constitutional term of o¢ ce -the …rst time this had occurred in that country's military-dominated history -by providing the o¢ cers with the best salaries, rapid promotions, and a generous allotment of fringe bene…ts" (p.70). Recent economic models of the military by Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), Besley and Robinson (2010) and Leon (2009) assume that the military can be bought o¤ through greater military spending. 3 We establish two empirical facts: (i) successful coups result in greater increases in military 1 For example, see the seminal papers by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Jones and Olken (2005) . 2 We de…ne coups as attempts to overthrow the government by a group within the military, which rules out overthrows in which the military does not participate. As it will become clear later, coups are quite distinct from civil wars. 3 In theory, military spending could a¤ect a coup's likelihood of success through its impact on its …ghting capability. We later show empirical evidence that suggests that this is not the case.
spending than failed coups, and (ii) coups are more likely when military spending as a share of GDP is relatively low. For this we use data for 153 countries for the period 1963-1999, which includes coups, information on whether they succeeded or failed, military spending, and other country level variables. The coup data comes from Belkin and Schofer (2003) , which is one of several coup datasets available, and the best suited for our purposes. The data on military spending and on the size of the military comes from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which is widely regarded as one of the most complete sources of historical military spending data and the best in terms of within country consistency.
The main di¢ culty in studying coups empirically is that the variables that determine whether coups happen, including military spending, can also be a¤ected by coups. This will be the case, for example, if the government fears that a coup is about to take place and adjusts military spending in an attempt to prevent it. To deal with this endogeneity problem we initially limit our attention to cases in which coups occurred, comparing the impact of success and failure on military spending; this allows us to establish empirical fact (i). This approach is analogous to treating the outcome of a coup as a natural experiment, creating a control group of failed coups and a treatment group of successful coups, and is similar to the strategy used by Jones and Olken (2009) to study the impact of assassinations. 4 Our identifying assumption is that the outcome of a coup is independent from the post-coup change in military spending, conditional on all relevant observable variables. This allows us to use di¤erence in di¤erences estimation to test for whether successful coups have a di¤erent impact on military spending than failed coups. We check for the validity of our identi…cation assumption in several ways. First, we plot the trends in military spending around the time of a coup, for both successful and failed coups, and see that the trends are quite similar. We then divide the coups into two groups, successful and failed, and compare the group sample means for each variable evaluated on the year before the coup. We …nd no di¤erence except that mean average military spending (as a fraction of GDP) before a successful coup is lower than that before a failed coup, suggesting that greater military spending does not improve a coup's probability of success. We also regress a coup's outcome on a number of controls evaluated the year before the coup, to see whether any of these variables is a good predictor of a coup's outcome; none of these variables predict the success or failure of coup attempts.
We compare military spending before and after each coup, and …nd that successful and failed coups di¤er signi…cantly in their impact on military spending, with successful coups leading to changes in military spending that are about 25% greater than the changes following failed coups. We …nd that the e¤ect is entirely due to changes following successful coups against non-democracies; changes in military spending following a successful coup against democracy are indistinguishable from those following a failed coup. To further deal with the concern that unobservables may a¤ect both coup outcome and the changes in military spending that follow a coup, we re-run our regressions using only coups that resulted in casualties. Our reasoning is that these are coups where the outcome is likely to have been uncertain ex-ante, and so where systematic di¤erences in unobservables are less likely. Our results are stronger when we focus on this reduced sample.
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In order to establish fact (ii) we estimate a panel speci…cation that looks at whether military spending is correlated with the incidence of coups. 6 We use …xed e¤ects to control for time-invariant country characteristics (e.g. institutions) that can a¤ect income, military spending and coups. We …nd a negative and signi…cant relationship between military spending and coups: within a country, years with lower military spending are followed by years when the probability of a coup is higher. For the average country-period pair, we …nd that increasing military spending as a share of GDP by one percentage point leads to a 1.5
percentage point decline in the probability of a coup in that 5 year period (where the mean 5 We look at a number of other variables one and three years after a coup, and check whether the means di¤er signi…cantly depending on the coup's outcome. We …nd no signi…cant di¤erence across success and failure except in institutions. This suggests that other policies and outcomes do not change di¤erentially depending on a coup's outcome. 6 This section focuses on correlations (rather than causal statements) and so the conclusions are more tentative. is 18%). To put this into context, a one standard deviation increase in military spending lowers the probability of a coup in the following …ve years in the average country-period pair from 18% to 8%. 7 Our results are consistent with the view that military spending matters for coups: coups are more likely when military spending is low relative to a country's average, and successful coups are followed by larger increases in military spending than failed coups. We argue that one plausible explanation for this is that coups against non-democracies are often staged by militaries that wish to increase military spending, while that is not the case for coups against democracy. These …ndings also lend support to the argument that the military may overlook other reasons to stage a coup when it is being paid enough. Nordlinger (1977) There are a number of alternative mechanisms that could connect military spending and coups, and our …ndings allow us to refute a number of them. Two of these alternatives, which would also undermine our identi…cation strategy, are that (a) the coup plotter's talent or ambition impacts on the success but also on changes in military spending, and that (b) there might be expected shocks to income that a¤ect both a coup's likelihood of success and military spending. We consider a number of other alternatives: (c) successful coups are followed by more repression and this requires increased military spending, (d) the results 7 We also …nd that income measures have a signi…cant negative relationship with coups when no …xed e¤ects are included, which is consistent with the literature (e.g. Londregan and Poole, 1990 ). However, this result vanishes when we introduce …xed e¤ects, suggesting that income per capita may be acting as a proxy for unobserved country-speci…c and time-invariant factors like institutions. The coe¢ cient for the income measures is positive but insigni…cant, so that there is no evidence linking income to the likelihood of coups.
are driven by decreases in military spending following failed coups (e.g. the government punishes the military), (e) the military is opportunistic so that military spending goes up after a successful coup even if that was not the motivation for it, and (f) low military spending may be a re ‡ection of a small military that can more easily coordinate. We show that none of these alternatives is consistent with both of our empirical …ndings. This paper contributes to the literature on political transitions that originates with the seminal work of Robinson (2001, 2005) . Its main contribution is to study coups empirically, and it is closely related to a small but growing theoretical literature on the military and its role in political transitions. Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) show the circumstances under which the military may rebel against the elite, stage a coup, and establish a military dictatorship. In their model, an elite may pay the military high wages to avoid coups. Besley and Robinson (2010) look at the optimal size of the military, and conclude that a government may choose to pay it an e¢ ciency wage in order to avoid coups. Leon (2009) looks at the relationship between war, coups and institutions, and shows that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the frequency of war and the likelihood of a coup. Our empirical …ndings lend support to a key feature of these models: that the military may stage coups if it is not properly funded. This paper also contributes to the literature on the economic causes and consequences of coups, a topic that has received much less attention than the economic causes of civil con ‡ict. 8 The seminal papers in this literature are by Poole (1990, 1996) .
Londregan and Poole (1990) estimates a simultaneous equation model using time series methods. It …nds that income per capita, economic growth and coups in the recent past are important predictors of future coup attempts. Our paper di¤ers primarily in its focus 8 The literature on the economic causes of civil wars is extensive. For example, Collier and Hoe-er (1998, 2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) found a correlation between economic circumstances and civil wars, while Miguel et al. (2004) showed that income shocks could cause civil war. More recently, Djankov and ReynalQuerol (2008) show that these correlations are spurious; while Ciccone (2011) shows that accounting for the persistence of shocks in Miguel et al. (2004) reverses the latter's results. Brueckner and Ciccone (2009) show that commodity price shocks and recessions in trading partners can lead to civil con ‡ict; Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2007) …nd that economic institutions are key determinants of civil wars. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes our data, while section 3 establishes empirical fact (i). Section 4 establishes empirical fact (ii), while section 5 discusses the possible mechanisms giving rise to our empirical …ndings. Section 6 concludes.
Data on Coups and Military Spending
We use a dataset with observations for 153 countries for the period 1963-1999, which includes coups, their outcome, military spending, and other country level variables. The coup data comes from Belkin and Schofer (2003) . There are a number of di¤erent coup datasets, and they di¤er across two key dimensions: on how they de…ne coups, and on whether they report failed as well as successful coups. Given our interest in military spending, we want our de…nition of coups to be limited to cases in which the military is a key actor. This includes most coups, and leaves out insurrections and coups by civilians, which are altogether very di¤erent events. Belkin-Schofer proves the most useful because it de…nes coups as actions aimed at removing the 'regime'by a 'small military coalition.' Naturally, we want a dataset that includes both successes and failures, as Belkin-Schofer does. Furthermore, the BelkinSchofer dataset is quite comprehensive in terms of country and time coverage.
To construct their data, Belkin and Schofer (2003) compiled a list of coups from a number of academic articles, and complemented it with data from Keesing's Contemporary Archives.
They checked the accuracy of this list by consulting regional experts and resolving con ‡icting cases with information from the New York Times and Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
More details can be found in Belkin and Schofer (2003) . We then construct the data on the outcome of coups (i.e. whether they succeeded or failed), for those coups in Belkin and Schofer (2003) , by using data from Banks (2001) and Powell and Thyne (2010) . In a small number of cases the outcome in Banks (2001) di¤ered from that in Powell and Thyne (2011); in these instances we checked the outcome by looking at online news sources.
We have coup information for 4,760 country-years, with a total of 306 coups taking place in 247 country-years, as shown in Table 1 . That is, coups occur in slightly more than 5% of our country-years. Table 2 shows that information on whether a coup succeeded or failed is available for 232 coups, and that in almost exactly half the cases the coup succeeded.
Although coups are infrequent, Table 3 shows that close to half of the 153 countries in the dataset experienced at least one coup between 1963 and 1999. Table 4 We use data on political regimes from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), which is rooted in the datasets in Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) . Like them, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) classify regimes into just two categories: democracy and dictatorship. We use two of their variables: 'democracy', which equals 1 if the country is democratic and 0 otherwise; and 'military regime', which equals 1 if the country is ruled by the military and 0 otherwise. Table 5 shows that most coups are staged against nondemocracies. However, whether a coup succeeds or fails appears to be unrelated to whether the target regime is democratic. Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority of successful coups lead to non-democratic regimes, while most failed coups result in the regime type remaining unchanged. We use data on GDP, population, and the allocation of countries to regions from the World Bank Development Indicators (2009). Our data on political instability comes from
Banks (2001); we use the 'weighted con ‡ict index'variable, which is listed by Powell (2010) as a good predictor of coup outcomes. We use data on casualties resulting from coups from Marshall and Marshall (2010) , corrected for missing values using news data we collected from the New York Times Archive. For more details on all variables please see the appendix.
Summary statistics for all key variables are shown in Table 7 .
3 Coup Outcome and Military Spending
Speci…cation
In this section we establish our …rst empirical …nding: (i) successful coups increase military spending by more than failed attempts. In order to test how successful coups impact on military spending we need to take into account that military spending might be trending.
We need to distinguish the true impact of experiencing a successful coup from the trend, and it is possible that trends di¤er across regions and between time periods with coups and those without. A natural way to proceed is to follow the approach used by Jones and Olken (2009) to examine the impact of assassinations on institutions and war. We limit our attention to cases where coups took place, and compare instances in which the coups succeeded with instances in which they failed. We use a di¤erence in di¤erences speci…cation, where our natural experiment is experiencing a successful coup; treated units are those where a successful coup took place, while the controls are those in which the coup failed. This allows us to estimate an average treatment e¤ect: the average impact on military spending from experiencing a successful coup instead of a failed one.
This approach eliminates the problem caused by the possible endogeneity of coup attempts. However, for us to correctly estimate the impact of successful coups on military spending, the grouping variable (in our case whether the coup succeeds or fails), needs to be conditionally independent from the variable of interest (military spending after the coup).
This requires that we control for selection into and out of the treatment group, so that once we have controlled for the factors that a¤ect a coup's probability of success, we can take the outcome of a coup to be independent from the changes in military spending that follow it. This is the 'common trends'condition that allows us to use failed coups as counterfactuals:
if one of the successful coups had instead failed, military spending would have changed as in the control group of failed coups. Figure 1 shows the trends in military spending for successful and failed coups, both before and after the event. The trends are constructed by …tting lines through the annual average military spending for each group (without controlling for other observables). The …gure shows military spending follows a similar trend for both successful and failed coups. This is true both before and after a coup, the main di¤erence being that in the case of successful coups the trend is shifted upward.
In the next section we present a number of empirical tests that provide further support for the common trends assumption. More generally, for the common trends condition to be valid it must be that assignment, once we control for observables, is independent from the change in military spending following a coup. There are a large number of observables that could impact on whether coups succeed or fail. In a recent study, Powell (2010) considers these variables and concludes that a coup's probability of success is signi…cantly related to political instability, regime type, soldier quality, the quantity of military personnel, and whether the regime is military. These are measured by the Banks (2001) 'weighted con ‡ict index' variable, whether the regime is democratic, military spending per soldier, the size of the military and whether the regime is military, respectively. We control for all of these variables and argue that, conditional on these controls, success is independent of the changes in military spending brought about by the coup. This requires that whether a coup attempt succeeds cannot depend on unobservables that also impact on the change in military spending following the coup. Possible unobservables include the coup plotter's talent, which might a¤ect whether the coup succeeds but also the plotter's ability to increase military spending afterwards; or expected shocks (e.g. to income) that may a¤ect the coup's outcome but also future military spending. However, it is unlikely that ability plays a role in the plotter being able or willing to increase military spending after a successful coup, and we later show empirical evidence that helps rule out this possibility. We also …nd evidence suggesting that expected shocks are unlikely to be driving the outcome of coups. There may be other unobservables, of course, and to deal with this possibility we repeat our estimation using only coups that resulted in casualties. In these coups the outcome is more likely to have been ex-ante uncertain, and so success is more plausibly unconditionally independent from changes in military spending.
Our main speci…cation is:
where m is military spending, i refers to a speci…c coup, and t indexes time. The year of a coup is t = 0, with t < 0 counting the years before the coup, and t > 0 counting the years after. The binary variable c i;t equals 0 before coup i and 1 after; the variable s i equals 0 if coup i failed, and 1 if it succeeded. The coe¢ cient 1 captures the impact of failed coups on military spending, while 1 + 3 measures the impact of successful coups on military spending. By looking at whether 3 di¤ers from zero we can establish whether successful coups have an impact on military spending that di¤ers signi…cantly from that of failed coups.
We expect that success leads to greater increases, so that 3 > 0, where 3 is the average treatment e¤ect:
where the identi…cation assumption is that a coup's outcome is uncorrelated with the error
The implication of this assumption is that once we include all relevant controls, coups that succeed would have led to the same expected change in military spending, had they instead failed, as coups that actually failed. The controls x i;t include the size of the military the year before the coup, as this may impact on the coup's outcome; income per capita (or income and population), which can a¤ect both military spending and the outcome of a coup; and regional and decade …xed e¤ects, as we know that there is substantial heterogeneity across regions and over time (where the number of observations precludes the estimation of country or year e¤ects). We also need to control for regime type, as it potentially a¤ects both the coup outcome and military spending. We do this by including a dummy for whether the regime the year before the coup was democratic, and a dummy for whether the government was in the hands of the military. 
Results
Our identi…cation strategy requires that we compare spending before and after coups, which becomes problematic when coups occur in consecutive years. We drop these coups, which reduces our sample to 157 coups, but in the appendix we report results for a second approach in which we group coups that take place in consecutive years into a single event, and compare spending before the …rst of these coups with spending after the last of these coups.
We …rst test for the extent to which the observable variables cited as determinants of a coup's outcome have a clear impact on the outcome of coups. Table 8 shows sample means for a number of variables, evaluated for country-years in the year prior to a coup. We separate the observations based on the coup attempt's outcome, and test for whether the di¤erence between the sample means is signi…cant. It is striking that most of these variables have the same mean across groups. The one exception is military spending as a percentage of GDP, where the mean is lower for successful coups. The fact that militaries with lower spending are more likely to succeed suggests that spending is unlikely to a¤ect a military's ability to stage successful coups. However, we should interpret this result with caution because it does not arise when military spending is measured in levels, and it is based on a cross-country average.
We also look at whether these variables can predict the outcome of a coup. We do this by estimating the following speci…cation:
The idea is to see whether these variables, either on their own or jointly, can help predict the outcome of a coup. Table 9 presents the results. In columns 1-4 we show estimates of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is the binary coup outcome: 1 if the coup succeeded, and 0 otherwise. On the right hand side we include a measure of military spending, a number of controls, and region and decade …xed e¤ects. We …nd that all of the coe¢ cients are insigni…cant, with the exception of the log of income per capita in column 1. In all four columns we can easily reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients (excluding the …xed e¤ects) are jointly signi…cant. Again, we should note that military spending appears to have no impact on a coup's outcome. In order to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable, in columns 5-8 of Table 9 we show the results of logit regressions. We again …nd that none of the coe¢ cients is signi…cant with the exception of the log of income per capita in column 5. An F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis of all coe¢ cients (excluding the …xed e¤ects) being jointly equal to zero. These results suggest that a coup's outcome is exogenous with respect to these observable variables evaluated the year before the coup takes place. 10 Although in what follows we control for these variables, there is no compelling evidence that they impact on the outcome of a coup. In columns 4-6 we repeat the regressions but use the log of military spending in levels as the dependent variable. We do this because the e¤ect we found could be generated and similar in size to that estimated in columns 2 and 3. Overall, Table 10 shows that successful coups lead to changes in military spending that are greater than those following failed coups.
11 Table 11 shows the results when we restrict our sample to coup attempts that resulted in casualties. All coups with non-zero casualty counts are included; we do not make use of the number of deaths because sometimes they are reported as approximations (e.g. "40-50 dead") and sometimes no numbers are given (e.g. "heavy casualties were reported").
The coe¢ cients are of a larger magnitude, and their signs are the same as before, with the 11 In table A1 we show the results when we include coups in consecutive years. We count these coups as one event, so that the pre-coup year is the one before the …rst coup, and the post-coup year is the …rst after the last coup. If any of these coups succeeded we treat the event as successful. We also include a control variable equal to the number of years included in the event. Again we …nd a signi…cant di¤erence in the change in military spending depending on a coup's outcome. di¤erence in the change in military spending across successful and failed coups still being signi…cant.
12 Table 12 and 13 repeat these estimations but focusing only on coups against democracies and non-democracies, respectively. As table 12 makes clear, coups against democracies do not lead to greater increases in military spending after success; the coe¢ cients are small and insigni…cant. 13 In table 13, on the other hand, the result is still present, and the coe¢ cients are now larger. This suggests that the impact we found in Table 10 is driven by coups against non-democracies and is evidence of an important di¤erence between these two types of regime: although it seems plausible that coups may be staged against non-democracies in order to increase military spending, this does not appear to be the case for democracies. 12 In table A2, columns 1-4 repeat the estimation but include data from three years before and three years after a coup. This enables us to better estimate the trends in the data, but the number of coups goes down to 80. (We cluster the standard errors to correct for serial autocorrelation, as suggested in Bertrand, Du ‡o and Mullanaithan (2004).) Once again, we …nd that successful coups lead to changes in military spending that are greater than the changes following failed coups. These results are signi…cant in columns 1, 2 and 4 (and the p-value for the interaction term in column 3 is 0.11). The estimated magnitudes are similar: roughly 1 percentage point in columns 1 and 2 and over 30% in columns 3 and 4. This suggests that little is lost by using only data from the year before and the year after a coup. In columns 5-8 we allow for regional time trends to check whether our results are due to us picking up the impact of di¤erent regional trends, rather than that of successful coups. We …nd that our estimates remain largely unchanged once we include regional time trends. 13 We should note, however, that the number of observations is relatively small. 14 Table A3 replicates this table but looking at the means 3 years before and 3 years after a coup.
Military Spending and Coup Attempts 4.1 Speci…cation
In this section we establish our second empirical …nding: coup attempts are more likely when military spending as a share of GDP is relatively low. If our hypothesis is correct and coups are staged in order to increase military spending, we would expect that a country is more likely to experience a coup when it sets its military spending relatively low. This suggests that a panel speci…cation with …xed e¤ects would be a natural framework to use, and we regress a measure of coups on military spending, income and a number of control variables:
where i indexes the country and t indexes time, t are year dummies, i are country dummies and " it is the error term. The variable coup it measures whether there is a coup attempt (regardless or whether it succeeded or failed) in a …ve year period; it equals 1 if there was at least one coup in the 5 year period, and 0 otherwise. There are seven periods: 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 . The right hand side variables are all evaluated in the year before the …ve year interval begins, that is : 1964, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 . 15 Military spending is measured as a percentage of GDP, and income is GDP per capita or GDP and population. We control for the size of the military, whether the regime is democratic, whether it is military, and for instability. This speci…cation is based on a growth regression and is in the spirit of that used by Londregan and Poole (1990).
We include country …xed e¤ects to take account of the possible omitted variable bias a¤ecting the estimated relationship between coups, income and military spending. One likely source of bias is the omission of country-speci…c characteristics (e.g. institutions) that may be driving coups and military spending in opposite directions. 16 In recent years new evidence has come to light suggesting that existing cross-country correlations disappear once …xed e¤ects are included. 17 The …xed e¤ects transformation implies that we identify the e¤ect of income and military spending on coups from within country variation only. We lag the right hand side variables to reduce the possibility of simultaneity, as it is less likely that coups in a given …ve year period a¤ect military spending and other variables a year before the start of that period. Regardless, these estimates should be interpreted as correlations and not as causal relationships. Table 15 shows the summary statistics for the data used in this section. The coups variable, which measures whether there was a coup or not in the …ve year period, has a mean of 0.18, indicating that in roughly 18% of the 5 year intervals there was at least one coup. The other variables are measured annually, although only in years before the 5 year periods begin, and the means and standard deviations are similar to those in the complete dataset.
Results
In Table 16 we show the panel results for speci…cation (3) . The …rst two columns exclude the country …xed e¤ects, and we …nd that the coe¢ cients on military spending and the income measures (GDP in column 1 and GDP per capita in column 2) are negative and signi…cant. The size of the military is only signi…cant in column 2, while the coe¢ cient on military regime is positive and signi…cant in both columns. Finally, instability is positive and signi…cant in both columns. These results are consistent with Poole (1990, 1996) , who showed that higher income per capita is correlated with a lower probability of a coup.
In columns 3 and 4 we introduce country …xed e¤ects. 18 Military spending is still negative but the magnitude is greater, and the results are signi…cant at the 1% level. 19 This shows that greater military spending in the year before the start of a …ve year period is associated with a lower probability of a coup attempt in that period. Speci…cally, a one percentage point increase in military spending at the mean (from 4.66 to 5.66) results in a small reduction in the probability of at least one coup in the next …ve years, from 18% to 16.5%. However, the result is substantial when we consider a one standard deviation change in military spending (from 4.66 to 11.44), which would imply a decrease from 18% to 8%. Of course, a one standard deviation increase in this case is substantial, but the large di¤erences in military spending that we observe in practice can explain an important part of the di¤erences in the incidence of coups. In columns (5) and (6) we run conditional logit regressions to check for the robustness of the result, although in this case we lose about half the countries in the dataset since they do not experience any coups in the sample period.
A surprising result is that income has no impact on coups once …xed e¤ects are included.
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It is also interesting that the size of the military and the type of regime (whether democratic or whether a military dictatorship) lose their predictive power once country …xed e¤ects are included. Only instability remains signi…cant, with its coe¢ cient largely unchanged. 21 These results are robust to changing the years used to construct the …ve year intervals (i.e. starting in 1964 or 1966), and to including a lagged dependent variable, in this case coups in the preceding …ve year period. 22 In Table 17 we repeat the estimation but separate 18 In both cases an F-test rejects the null hypothesis that all …xed e¤ects are equal, suggesting that they need to be included. 19 This is reassuring, considering that it is common for cross-country results to vanish once …xed e¤ects are introduced. 20 This would seem to indicate that income levels are not relevant once we control for country-speci…c characteristics, and that the Londregan and Poole (1990) result might not be robust. We should note, however, that these statements should be interpreted with caution because annual GDP measurements exhibit a substantial amount of error. 21 There is the concern, however, that this variable is mechanically related to coups. The results are largely unchanged when this variable is removed. 22 The coe¢ cients are insigni…cant and have a negligible impact on our estimates, while the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable introduces a number of econometric complications. For example, the 'Nickell bias' becomes a problem. Nickell (1982) showed that a lagged dependent variable causes the parameter estimates to be inconsistent when …xed e¤ects are included. the impact of military spending depending on whether the country is democratic or not the year before the 5 year period begins. We …nd that the coe¢ cient on military spending in the case of non-democracy remains as before, and that the di¤erence between democracy and non-democracy is small and insigni…cant. Again income does not appear to have an impact on the incidence of coups. In summary, the evidence in this section shows that lower military spending within a country is correlated with an increase in the incidence of coups, establishing our empirical …nding (ii).
Mechanisms
Our results show that successful coups lead to changes in military spending that are greater than those that would have taken place if the coups had instead failed. We have also shown that there is a correlation between low within country military spending (as a share of GDP) and the probability of a coup. There are a number of mechanisms that could generate one or the other …nding, but we argue that a plausible interpretation that is consistent with both …ndings is that the military's desire for increased military spending is a motivation for coups, at least when staged against non-democracies. Two of the possible alternative mechanisms connecting military spending and coups also represent threats to identi…cation: Alternative (a) is di¢ cult to test directly because the coup plotter's talent is unobservable.
However, Table 11 shows that our results are robust to focusing only on coups with casualties, and in these the coup plotter's talent is more likely to be independent of coup outcome.
Furthermore, tables 14 and A3 show that successful and failed coups do not seem to di¤er, one and three years later, in variables like GDP, GDP per capita and political instability, that could also be a¤ected by a coup plotter's talent. Likewise, these tables seem to rule out alternative (b), as there appear to be no di¤erences in variables where shocks could be expected. 23 Our third alternative (c) is that successful coups lead to a new regime that needs repression to stay in power, and that this requires an increase in military spending. This does not explain why a fall in military spending would increase the likelihood of a coup. It is also at odds with the …nding that political instability is the same across successful and failed coups, and that the e¤ect is entirely due to autocracies; there seems to be no compelling reason why more repression would be needed after a successful coup against a non-democracy than after one against a democracy. Alternative (d) can be ruled out too: if military spending falls following a failed coup because the military is being punished, there is no reason why lower military spending before an attempt would be correlated with the likelihood of a coup.
Furthermore, it is also inconsistent with Figure 1 , which shows that coups lead to an upward shift in the military spending trend for successful coups and virtually no change for failed coups. Alternative (e), that increases in military spending after successful coups simply re ‡ect opportunism, cannot explain why lower military spending increases the likelihood of a coup. Alternative (f) suggests that low military spending simply re ‡ects a smaller military that, being able to easily coordinate, is more likely to stage a coup. This alone, however, cannot explain why military spending goes up following a successful coup. 23 Although it could be possible that successful coups lead to changes in policy that completely prevent these shocks, this seems unlikely. The trends are constructed by fitting lines that go through the mean military spending for each group in each year t, where t=0 corresponds to the year in which the coup took place. Negative values of t refer to years before the coup; positive values refer to years after the coup. 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 . Democracy is a binary variable that equals 1 if the country was democratic and 0 othewise; Military Regime equals 1 if the government was in the hands of the military, 0 otherwise; Instability measure political instability and is from Banks (2001) . All variables are dated the year before the a five year period starts. Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the country level, conditional logit errors are bootstrapped. Coup (5 years) is equal to 1 if there was at least one coup in the 5 year period, and 0 otherwise. The periods are 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 Notes: *significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the country level, conditional logit errors are bootstrapped. Coup (5 years) is equal to 1 if there was at least one coup in the 5 year period, and 0 otherwise. The periods are 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 Democracy -This variable is the 'democracy'variable from Cheibub, Instability -We use the variable S18F2 'Weighted Con ‡ict Index'from Banks (2001) , which is the same used by Powell (2010) . This variable is calculated by giving weights to scores on assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations. This variable takes very large numerical values, and so in the regressions we measure it in thousands.
ONLINE APPENDIX
Casualties -This data is from the Center for Systemic Peace database by Marshall and Marshall (2010) , complemented with data we collected from the New York Times Archive. We coded it as a binary variable; 0 if no deaths were reported, 1 if at least one death was reported.
In the panel section, we use the following variable:
